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Simple Cournot models of divestiture tend to generate incentives to divest which are too strong, predicting that firms will break up
into an infinite number of divisions resulting in perfect competition.This paper shows that if the order of divestitures is endogenized,
firms will always choose sequential, and hence very limited, divestitures. Divestitures favor the larger firm and the follower in
a sequential game. Divestitures in which the larger firm is the follower generate greater industry profit and social welfare, but a
smaller consumer surplus.
1. Introduction
Firms often spin off divisions that compete directly with the
parent business. For example, Siemens planned in early 2009
to divest its 34% stake in AREVA NP, a Franco-German joint
venture in nuclear reactors, and develop its own nuclear capa-
bilities (The Economist, 1/29/09). Fast-food chain Wendy’s
spun off fast-growing Tim Hortons in 2006 after realizing
that “Tim’s was beginning to compete directly with Wendy’s”
(The Economist, 9/23/06). Note that such spinoffs promise
to increase competition rather than reduce it. On August 3,
2010, FordMotor Company completed the sale of Volvo Cars
to Chinese carmaker Geely for $1.8 billion. Ford CEO Alan
Mulally said that the divestiture “will allow us to sharpen our
focus on the Ford brand around the world and continue to
deliver on our One Ford plan serving our customers with the
very best cars and trucks in the world” (AutoWeek, 8/3/10).
Geely’s president Li Shufu remarked that Volvo would now
have the freedom to “enter market segments that were previ-
ously closed to it because they were occupied bymodels from
Jaguar, Land Rover or Ford itself ” (The Economist, 3/31/10).
Separated from Ford, Volvo will surely compete with its
old stablemate in the premium car market. Obviously Ford
has created a competitor through the divestiture, and one
wonders why it wanted to do so. Would not it have been
better for Ford to keep Volvo under its roof and thus contain
the competition between the two brands?1 As these examples
show, divestitures are very common in the business world,
andmany divestitures create direct competitors for the parent
business.2 This seems contrary to the common understand-
ing that a company should seek to minimize competition.
Why would a company ever want to spin off a business
which will compete directly with itself? The answer lies in
the responses from competitors. Although the newly created
competition will eat into the parent company’s business, it
also applies pressure on rival companies. If the separation
succeeds in squeezing existing rivals’ market shares, the joint
profit of the parent and the divested unit may increase, and
the parent gains by extracting surplus through the unit’s sale
price. In other words, a company uses internal competition
to gain competitive advantage over its external rivals. It is
therefore not surprising that firms have an incentive to divest.
What is surprising is that the incentive can be very strong.
Standard Cournot models would predict that when firms
produce homogeneous products at constant marginal cost
and divestitures cost nothing, firms will divest into an infinite
number of offsprings, leading to perfect competition [1].
This seemingly unreasonable prediction, that divestiture
should always be profitable, can be called the divestiture
paradox. Some solutions to the paradox have been offered:
divestitures will be limited if they are costly [2] or products
are differentiated [3, 4]. Those solutions assume that firms
divest simultaneously. In real life, however, divestitures take
time to formulate, and the decisions are often reported long
before completion. It is therefore more appropriate to model
divestitures as sequential choices rather than simultaneous
ones. At the very least, the order of divesting should be endog-
enously determined.
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This study investigated the incentive to divest when the
order of divestiture is decided endogenously. In an industry
with two firms producing homogeneous products, firms were
found always to divest sequentially and doing so greatly
limits the number of divisions. The divestiture paradox can
therefore be solved by endogenizing the order of divestitures.
Simultaneous divestiture is no longer an equilibrium because
a firm is always better off playing a sequential game, either as a
leader or as a follower. A leader can always choose its equilib-
rium strategy in the simultaneous game and achieve its payoff
there, so it must be no worse off when it chooses differently in
the sequential game. Because divestitures are strategic com-
plements and the leader will be hurt by the follower’s divesti-
ture, the leader limits its own divestiture in order to constrain
the follower’s. As a result, a follower is also better off.
This research reflects the simple idea that the order
of business choices should be endogenized whenever it is
appropriate, especially when the results depend greatly on
the order. Some choices such as prices or output levels
may be regarded as being made simultaneously because
they can easily be changed or are unlikely to be known to
rivals beforehand, but divestitures take time and are usually
reported by themedia. Endogenizing the order of divestitures
is particularly appropriate and easy because both firms benefit
bymoving from a simultaneous game to a sequential one, and
such a move does not require any coordination. Even if orig-
inally the decisions were supposed to be simultaneous, a firm
can easily turn them into a sequential one by, say, committing
to a choice before other firms have made their decisions.
So the major novelty of this study is the endogenization
of the order of divestitures. Another innovation is its way of
modeling divestitures. Capital was assumed to be required
in the production, which implies increasing marginal costs
(in the short run). Compared with the commonly used
formulation assuming constant marginal costs, this cost
structure leads to a more reasonable modeling of divestiture:
a divestiture decomposes the parent’s capital so that each
offspring is smaller than the parent. It also admits constant
marginal cost as a special case where endogenizing the order
of divestitures generates the most striking difference. With
constant marginal costs, simultaneous divestitures induce
each firm to divest into an infinite number of divisions, lead-
ing to perfect competition. When the order is endogenized,
by contrast, the leader will not divest at all while the follower
divests into only two divisions.
The presence of capital also enables the study of firm
asymmetry. Divestitures can be shown to favor the larger firm
and the follower. Divestitures increase social welfare at the
expense of the industry’s total profit.The leader is always hurt,
but the followermay benefit if it is sufficiently large. A sequen-
tial divestiture in which the larger firm is the follower gener-
ates greater industry profit and social welfare, but a smaller
consumer surplus than the alternative sequence. This is
because the smaller firm tends to divest more than the larger
one, and the follower tends to divest more than the leader. If
the larger firm is the follower, the industry’s overall divestiture
is more limited and the resulting divisions are more balanced
in size. The first effect helps industry profit and hurts con-
sumer surplus, while the second effect improves production
efficiency and hence helps industry profit and social welfare.
There is a small body of literature on divestiture (also
known as strategic divisionalization), all assuming symmetric
firms, constant marginal costs and simultaneous divestiture.
Corchon [1] and Polasky [5] have demonstrated how a firm
may gain competitive advantage by breaking itself up into
autonomous units,3 and found that the incentive to divest can
be too strong, to the detriment of the divesting firms. Baye et
al. [2] have suggested that divestitures will be limited if they
are costly. All three of these studies assumed homogeneous
products. By contrast, Ziss [3] and Yuan [4] showed that
the incentive to divest can also be reduced by product
differentiation; that is, the number of divisions decreases
when products are more differentiated.4 As a result, the
divestiture paradox can be solved by introducing product
differentiation: each firm will divest into a finite number of
divisions when products are sufficiently differentiated, and
perfect competition will not result.5
This paper assumes homogeneous products with increas-
ing marginal costs. Such a setting is mathematically equiv-
alent to assuming differentiated products with constant
marginal costs [6]. It is therefore no wonder that both
approaches can solve the divestiture paradox. Nevertheless,
there are some subtle differences between the two formu-
lations, as will be explained. More importantly, this paper’s
conclusions are based on the endogenized order of divesti-
tures, while Ziss [3] and Yuan [4] both assumed simultaneous
divestitures.
The incentive to divest echoes that for creating com-
peting divisions within a company.6 Creane and David-
son [7] have provided many examples of multidivisional
firms that encourage internal competition, especially in the
hotel, brewery, fast-food, automobile, and tobacco industries.
They pointed out (p. 954) that “many firms offer multiple
products that appear to be either identical or extremely
close substitutes for one another.” Conlin [8] found evidence
of strong competition between different brands within a
hotel chain. Kalnins and Lafontaine [9] discovered empirical
regularities in the ownership of newly opened franchised
units in the hotel industry and speculated that the regularities
are best explained by an optimal balance between internal and
external competition.
The divestiture paradoxmirrors the better-knownmerger
paradox, which says that firms tend to have too weak an
incentive to merge [10]. The two paradoxes are actually
two sides of the same coin—both are caused by a too
strong response from competitors.7 This is hardly surprising,
as divestitures are simply reverse mergers. Endogenizing
merger decisions, however, may or may not solve the merger
paradox.8 A recent study by Qiu and Zhou [11] treated
divestitures and mergers in a single model, which solves
both paradoxes simultaneously, as the interaction between
the two restructuring activities weakens the incentive to
divest and strengthens the incentive to merge. Reflecting in
a merger context the logic of using internal competition to
gain competitive advantage, Mialon [12] demonstrated that
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two merging firms may choose to remain as independent
and competing divisions after proper reallocation of capital
between them.9
A number of studies have addressed the order of moves
in two-player games. Dowrick [13] endogenized the order by
allowing duopolists to simultaneously choose a role as either
the leader or the follower before they engage in competition
in the product market. Hamilton and Slutsky [14] have
suggested that two perfectly symmetric firms may choose
to play a sequential game, and the order of moves can then
be endogenized through either observable delay or action
commitment. Finally, Henkel [15] has suggested that a player
may choose a role somewhere between a leader and a follower
bymaking a commitment to a role which can be revoked later
at some cost.
2. The Model
Assume that two firms, indexed by 𝑥 and 𝑦, produce a
homogenous good. The production cost of firm 𝑖 (𝑖 ∈ {𝑥, 𝑦})
is assumed to be 𝐶 (𝑡
𝑖
, 𝑞
𝑖
) = 𝑞
2
𝑖
/2𝑡
𝑖
, where 𝑡
𝑖
is 𝑖’s capital
stock and 𝑞
𝑖
is its output. This cost function has been used
previously in merger studies [16–18] and can be viewed as
a short-run cost derived from a Cobb-Douglas production
function.10
The two firms play a three-stage game. In stage one
(the timing stage), the two firms determine the sequence of
their future divestitures by simultaneously choosing a role
𝑟
𝑖
from {𝐿, 𝐹}, where 𝐿 means leader and 𝐹 means follower.
If 𝑟
𝑥
̸= 𝑟
𝑦
the two firms will divest sequentially in stage two,
with the one choosing 𝐿 divesting first and the other divesting
afterward. If 𝑟
𝑥
= 𝑟
𝑦
, they will divest simultaneously. In stage
two (the divestiture stage), the two firms divest according to
the sequence determined in the previous stage.11 To divest is
to break up a firm’s capital into several smaller units, termed
divisions, which will compete independently in the product
market. Each parent firm’s payoff will be the sum of all its
divisions’ future profits. Since it is optimal for a parent to
distribute its capital equally among its divisions,12 the divesti-
ture decision comes down to a single choice of the number of
divisions, which for simplicity will be treated as a continuous
variable. In stage three (the competition stage), all the divi-
sions fromboth firms compete independently and simultane-
ously a` la Cournot.The product demand is 𝑝 = 𝑎−𝑏𝑄, where
𝑎, 𝑏 > 0 and 𝑄 is the total output of all competing divisions.
3. Analysis
3.1. Stage Three: Cournot Competition. The appendix shows
how to derive the Cournot outcome. Denote the set of all
competing divisions by 𝐷. For division 𝑘 ∈ 𝐷, let 𝑔
𝑘
≡
𝑏𝑡
𝑘
/(1 + 𝑏𝑡
𝑘
) and 𝐺 ≡ ∑
𝑑∈𝐷
𝑔
𝑑
. Division 𝑘’s Cournot profit
is then 𝜋
𝑘
= (𝑎
2
𝑔
𝑘
(1 + 𝑔
𝑘
))/(2𝑏(1 + 𝐺)
2
). Without loss of
generality,13 normalize 𝑎 ≡ √2 and 𝑏 ≡ 1. Then
𝜋
𝑘
=
𝑔
𝑘
(1 + 𝑔
𝑘
)
(1 + 𝐺)
2
, (1)
where
𝑔
𝑘
=
𝑡
𝑘
1 + 𝑡
𝑘
, 𝐺 = ∑
𝑑∈𝐷
𝑔
𝑑
, (2)
with 𝑞
𝑘
= (𝑎/𝑏) (𝑔
𝑘
/(1 + 𝐺)), 𝑄 = (𝑎/𝑏) (𝐺/(1 + 𝐺)), and
𝑝 = 𝑎/(1 + 𝐺). Division 𝑘’s marginal cost at equilibrium is
therefore 𝑚𝑐
𝑘
= 𝑞
𝑘
/𝑡
𝑘
= (𝑎/(𝑏(1 + 𝐺))) (1/(1 + 𝑡
𝑘
)), and its
market share is 𝑠
𝑘
≡ 𝑞
𝑘
/𝑄 = 𝑔
𝑘
/𝐺.
3.2. Stage Two: Divestitures. Let 𝑖 ∈ {𝑥, 𝑦} and 𝑗 = {𝑥, 𝑦} \ 𝑖. If
firm 𝑖 chooses to form 𝑛
𝑖
divisions, each division’s capital will
be 𝑡
𝑖
/𝑛
𝑖
. Let 𝑔
𝑖
= (𝑡
𝑖
/𝑛
𝑖
)/(1 + (𝑡
𝑖
/𝑛
𝑖
)) = 𝑡
𝑖
/(𝑛
𝑖
+ 𝑡
𝑖
). Firm 𝑖’s
payoff is then
𝜋
𝑖
(𝑛
𝑖
, 𝑛
𝑗
) =
𝑛
𝑖
𝑔
𝑖
(1 + 𝑔
𝑖
)
(1 + 𝑛
𝑖
𝑔
𝑖
+ 𝑛
𝑗
𝑔
𝑗
)
2
. (3)
Given 𝑛
𝑗
, 𝑖’s optimal choice is derived as 𝑛∗
𝑖
≡
argmax
𝑛𝑖>0
𝜋
𝑖
(𝑛
𝑖
, 𝑛
𝑗
) = 1 + 𝑛
𝑗
𝑔
𝑗
. Define a firm’s best
response to its rival’s choice of 𝑛
𝑗
as
𝑛
∗
(𝑛
𝑗
) ≡ 1 + 𝑛
𝑗
𝑔
𝑗
= 1 +
𝑛
𝑗
𝑡
𝑗
𝑛
𝑗
+ 𝑡
𝑗
. (4)
If the two firms divest simultaneously, the equilibrium is
determined by solving the two best response equations, 𝑛𝑀
𝑖
=
𝑛
∗
(𝑛
𝑀
𝑗
) and 𝑛𝑀
𝑗
= 𝑛
∗
(𝑛
𝑀
𝑖
), where the superscript𝑀 indicates
simultaneous divestiture. As a result,
𝑛
𝑀
𝑖
=
1 + 2𝑡
𝑗
+ √(1 + 2𝑡
𝑖
) (1 + 2𝑡
𝑗
) (1 + 2𝑡
𝑖
+ 2𝑡
𝑗
)
2 (1 + 𝑡
𝑖
+ 𝑡
𝑗
)
. (5)
If the two firms divest sequentially, the follower will adopt
the best response: 𝑛𝐹 = 𝑛∗(𝑛𝐿). Anticipating this, the leader’s
optimal choice is 𝑛𝐿 = argmax
𝑛𝑖>0
𝜋
𝑖
(𝑛
𝑖
, 𝑛
∗
(𝑛
𝑖
)), which has a
unique solution on (0,∞) defined by
𝛽 (𝑛
𝐿
) = 0, (6)
where
𝛽 (𝑛
𝐿
) ≡ − [(1 + 𝑡
𝐿
+ 𝑡
𝐹
)
2
+ 𝑡
2
𝐹
] (𝑛
𝐿
)
3
+ [(1 + 𝑡
𝐹
) (1 + 2𝑡
𝐹
− 𝑡
2
𝐿
) − 4𝑡
𝐿
𝑡
2
𝐹
] (𝑛
𝐿
)
2
+ 𝑡
𝐿
[(1 + 2𝑡
𝐹
) (2 + 2𝑡
𝐹
+ 𝑡
𝐿
) − 2𝑡
𝐿
𝑡
2
𝐹
] 𝑛
𝐿
+ 𝑡
2
𝐿
(1 + 𝑡
𝐹
) (1 + 2𝑡
𝐹
) .
(7)
3.3. Stage One: The Order of Moving. Denote firm 𝑖’s equilib-
rium choice of the number of divisions by 𝑛𝐿
𝑖
when 𝑖 is the
leader in a sequential divestiture (and accordingly 𝑗 is the
follower), by 𝑛𝐹
𝑖
when 𝑖 is the follower (and 𝑗 is the leader), and
by 𝑛𝑀
𝑖
when 𝑖 and 𝑗 divest simultaneously.The corresponding
equilibrium payoff for 𝑖 is denoted by 𝜋𝑅
𝑖
, where 𝑅 = 𝐿, 𝐹,𝑀.
The appendix proves the following ranking, which is central
to the major conclusions of this analysis.
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Lemma 1. 𝑛𝐿
𝑖
< 𝑛
𝐹
𝑖
< 𝑛
𝑀
𝑖
and 𝜋𝐹
𝑖
> 𝜋
𝐿
𝑖
> 𝜋
𝑀
𝑖
.
Because 𝜋𝐹
𝑖
> 𝜋
𝐿
𝑖
> 𝜋
𝑀
𝑖
and 𝜋𝐹
𝑗
> 𝜋
𝐿
𝑗
> 𝜋
𝑀
𝑗
, it is never an
equilibrium for the two firms to choose 𝑟
𝑖
= 𝑟
𝑗
in stage one,
and it is always an equilibrium for 𝑟
𝑖
= 𝐿 and 𝑟
𝑗
= 𝐹 or for
𝑟
𝑖
= 𝐹 and 𝑟
𝑗
= 𝐿. Therefore, consider the following.
Proposition 2. (i) Simultaneous divestiture is never an equi-
librium.
(ii) Sequential divestiture (with either firm serving as the
leader) is always an equilibrium.
(iii) In equilibrium, 𝑛
𝑖
is finite and 𝜋
𝑖
> 0 even though the
products are homogeneous and divestiture is costless.
Propositions 2(i) and (ii) are corollaries of Lemma 1.
Proposition 2(iii) is true because 𝑛𝐿
𝑖
< 𝑛
𝐹
𝑖
< 𝑛
𝑀
𝑖
(Lemma 1)
and 𝑛𝑀
𝑖
is finite.
4. Discussion
Proposition 2 delivers the key message of the analysis which
is that divestitures will be limited in scope if firms can choose
the order of their divestitures. The following discussion
presents the intuition suggesting this result, the unique
features of the model, and the properties of the equilibrium.
To understand the discussion, it is useful to first look at the
incentives for and effects of a unilateral divestiture.
4.1. The Incentive to Divest. In what follows, the number
of divisions will be called the scope of divestiture, or sim-
ply divestiture. Increasing a firm’s divestiture generates the
following tradeoff:14 it increases the competition between
the firm’s own divisions, hurting the firm, but the increased
competition also forces rival firms to retreat, benefiting
the firm. When divisions from the same parent compete
independently, they create a negative externality for one
another. From the viewpoint of the parent firm, fixing its
Cournot rivals’ outputs, these divisions produce too much.
Rivals’ outputs, however, will not be fixed. Precisely because
the divested divisions overproduce, rivals will produce less (as
outputs are strategic substitutes), which benefits the divesting
firm. The tradeoff between the two effects determines the
optimal scope of a divestiture.
Now consider the effects of increasing one firm’s divesti-
ture while holding the other’s constant. Firm 𝑖’s profit has
been given by (3): 𝜋
𝑖
= (𝑛
𝑖
𝑔
𝑖
(1 + 𝑔
𝑖
))/(1 + 𝑛
𝑖
𝑔
𝑖
+ 𝑛
𝑗
𝑔
𝑗
)
2. The
joint output of all its divisions is 𝑞
𝑖
= (𝑎/𝑏) (𝑛
𝑖
𝑔
𝑖
/(1 + 𝑛
𝑖
𝑔
𝑖
+
𝑛
𝑗
𝑔
𝑗
)), and the total market share of those divisions, which
for simplicity is called 𝑖’s market share, is
𝑠
𝑖
≡
𝑞
𝑖
𝑞
𝑖
+ 𝑞
𝑗
=
𝑛
𝑖
𝑔
𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
𝑔
𝑖
+ 𝑛
𝑗
𝑔
𝑗
. (8)
All these variables depend on the comparison between 𝑛
𝑖
𝑔
𝑖
and 𝑛
𝑗
𝑔
𝑗
. Let us call 𝑛
𝑖
𝑔
𝑖
≡ 𝑛
𝑖
𝑡
𝑖
/(𝑛
𝑖
+ 𝑡
𝑖
) firm 𝑖’s dispersion,
which obviously increaseswith the scope of its divestiture. For
a fixed 𝑛
𝑗
, therefore, increasing 𝑛
𝑖
increases 𝑖’s dispersion and
thus the industry’s aggregate dispersion, while 𝑗’s dispersion
remains unchanged. As a result, increasing a firm’s divestiture
will expand the total output and market share of its divisions
and depress the joint output, market share, and profit of its
rival’s divisions.
Direct observation of the best response (4) reveals the
following properties:
𝜕𝑛
∗
𝜕𝑡
𝑗
> 0,
𝜕𝑛
∗
𝜕𝑛
𝑗
> 0. (9)
That is, a firm will divest more if its rival is larger or divests
more. The second property indicates that divestitures are
strategic complements. Both properties arise for the same
reason. When the rival increases its capital or divestiture, its
dispersion increases, expanding its market share and reduc-
ing the market share of the firm contemplating divestiture.
As has been discussed earlier, the optimal divestiture is
determined by the tradeoff between the competition among
the divesting firm’s own divisions and the retreat of the rival
firm’s divisions. When the rival’s market share is larger, the
advantage of divestiture increases because there are now
more rival divisions to respond to the divestiture, while the
disadvantage of the divestiture will be smaller because the
divesting firm’s divisions are not earning much anyway. As
a result, the firm will divest more.15
4.2. Endogenized Order and the Scope of Divestiture. The
previous discussion concerns the incentives for and effects
of a unilateral divestiture. When both firms divest, the equi-
librium is governed by two forces: a firm’s divestiture hurts
rival firms and divestitures are strategic complements. The
two forces imply that the two firms overdivest to each other’s
detriment. In fact, the incentive to divest can be so strong that
(assuming a homogeneous product, linear demand, constant
marginal costs, and costless divestitures) firmswill divest into
an infinite number of divisions even when the industry has
only two firms, leading to perfect competition [1].
This seemingly unreasonable prediction, that breaking up
a firm is always profitable, is the “divestiture paradox.” Both
this and the merger paradox are driven by the same force:
rival firms are too responsive to other firms’ restructuring,
be it a divestiture or a merger. One solution to the divestiture
paradox is to make divestitures costly [2]. A second solution
is to let firms produce differentiated products so that the
response from rival products is weakened [3, 4].
Surprisingly, all previous studies have assumed that firms
divest simultaneously. According to Lemma 1, however, both
firms will be better off playing a sequential game rather than
the simultaneous one. The reason why sequential moves are
better for both players can be understood from the two forces
at work.The leader in a sequential game will choose a smaller
scope of divestiture than in the simultaneous game, because
doing so will constrain the follower’s divestiture and hence
its damage to the leader. Since the follower’s payoff increases
when its rival divests less, the follower is better off. The
leader must also be better off because it can guarantee itself
the simultaneous-move payoff by choosing its simultaneous-
game strategy in the sequential game and can only do better
if it chooses differently.
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Once it has been established that both firms are better off
in a sequential game, it is hard to see why they would play
the simultaneous one which gives them an inferior outcome.
Scholars have never explained why they have assumed firms
divest simultaneously, but as has been shown, once the order
of moves is endogenized, divestitures will be carried out
sequentially. In real life, the order of business decisions is
usually determined endogenously. Endogenization is partic-
ularly easy in the case of divestiture because both firms benefit
by moving from the simultaneous game to a sequential
game, and the move does not require any coordination,
which is not the case in many other situations (such as the
prisoners’ dilemma) where the players are trapped in an
inferior outcome.
To summarize, even if products are homogeneous and
divestitures are costless, firms will not divest into an infinite
number of divisions and therefore will not face perfect
competition. Proposition 2 demonstrates that, after all, firms
will find a way to constrain mutually damaging divestitures.
The divestiture paradox disappears as soon as the order of
divestitures is endogenized.
4.3. Cost Structure. Having established the major conclusion
of the paper, we are now ready to discuss the features of the
model and the properties of the equilibrium. In addition to an
endogenized order of divestiture, this model has assumed the
involvement of capital, which leads to a marginal cost (mc)
that increases with output. By contrast, all previous models
have assumed constant mc. Increasing marginal cost yields
implications for divestiture which are more reasonable. If
marginal costs are constant, each extra division will be an
exact replica of the parent firm: to divest amounts to create
something out of nothing. Divestitures modelled in this way
contradict the general understanding that a division should
be somewhat smaller than the parent firm. By contrast, when
marginal costs are increasing, each division gets a portion of
the parent’s capital and is therefore smaller (in the sense of
having higher production costs) than the parent.16
Note that modeling divestitures when breaking up a firm
is reasonable and meaningful only when mc is increasing.
To understand this, it is helpful to consider divestitures as
reverse mergers. In merger, the merged entity takes over
the production facilities of the merging firms and optimizes
its production using those facilities. It can be easily shown
that such within-firm optimization will give rise to a cost
function of the form 𝑞2/(2(𝑡
𝑖
+𝑡
𝑗
)) for themerged firm, where
𝑡
𝑖
and 𝑡
𝑗
are the capital stocks of the two merging firms.
Because themerged firm’s cost function is that of a single firm
with capital 𝑡
𝑖
+ 𝑡
𝑗
, we may regard the merger as a process
of pooling the merging firms’ capital. As a reverse merger,
then, a divestiture can be viewed as decomposing the parent’s
capital.That explains themodeling of divestiture in this study
and why a division’s cost is higher than the parent’s.
To summarize, the cost structure assumed in this study
differs from that assumed in previous studies in two respects:
marginal cost is increasing rather than being constant, and
a division is smaller than the parent. The second aspect is
to generate a reasonable modeling of divestitures. To justify
such modeling, however, we need to introduce capital stock,
which naturally gives rise to the first aspect of increasingmc.
So increasingmc is a necessary element of themodel to justify
why and how a division is smaller than the parent and is
therefore essential for modeling divestitures.
Once capital is introduced into the model, the formula-
tion with constant mc becomes a special case where both 𝑡
𝑖
and 𝑡
𝑗
approach infinity so that the two firms’ marginal costs
approach zero. In that case, a division is indeed identical to
the parent.
At this point, it is helpful to discuss the relationship
between increasing marginal cost and product differentia-
tion. As Vives [6] has pointed out, assuming homogeneous
products with increasing mc is mathematically equivalent to
assuming differentiated products with constantmc. Econom-
ically the two situations produce the same effect of weakening
the interaction between Cournot competitors. That is why
either setting can solve the divestiture paradox: even with
constant mc, the scope of divestitures will be limited if
products are differentiated [3, 4]. Although mathematically
equivalent, assuming increasing mc has the advantage of
avoiding the complication of dealing with different degrees of
substitution for products within and across groups.17 Finally,
increasingmc and product differentiation can be combined in
themodeling, but that would not change any of the qualitative
results.18
4.4. The Role of Capital. This model differs from those
previously proposed both in its cost structure and in its
endogenized order of moves. It must be pointed out that
the assumption of increasing mc is not driving the results
of Proposition 2. Even when marginal costs are constant,
the scope of divestiture is still limited as long as the order
of divestiture is determined endogenously. Inspecting the
simultaneous and sequential divestiture choices depicted in
(5) and (6), we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If 𝑡
𝑖
→ ∞ and 𝑡
𝑗
→ ∞, then 𝑛𝐿 = 1 and 𝑛𝐹 = 2,
but 𝑛𝑀
𝑖
= ∞.
The lemma says that even when marginal costs are
constant, divestiture is limited if the firms divest sequentially.
In particular, the leader will not divest at all while the follower
divests into two divisions. This is in sharp contrast with the
result when firms have to divest simultaneously. In that case,
each firm will divest into an infinite number of divisions,
leading to perfect competition, as previous studies have
concluded [1].The reason for such contrast is that, as has been
explained in Section 4.2, when divestitures are sequential,
the leader has a chance to influence the follower’s choice,
and it will limit its own divestiture in order to constrain the
follower’s. Such reasoning is independent of the cost structure
and is therefore still valid when marginal costs are constant.
Proposition 2 still holds, so the equilibriumwill be sequential
divestitures of limited scope.
To further investigate the difference between sequen-
tial and simultaneous divestitures and how the difference
depends on capital, consider the overall degree of divestiture
in the industry and the two firms’ profits. Because the
firms are asymmetric in terms of both their capital stocks
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and the order of divestiture, adding up the number of the
two firms’ divisions is meaningless. The scope of divestiture
industrywide is better measured by the Cournot equilibrium
price𝑝 = 𝑎/(1+𝐺). To visualize the effects, assume symmetric
firms (𝑡
𝑖
= 𝑡
𝑗
= 𝑡) and use the no-divestiture situation
(𝑛
𝑖
= 𝑛
𝑗
= 1) as the benchmark.19 Superscripts 𝑄,𝑀, and 0
indicate sequential, simultaneous, and no divestiture. Figure 1
shows the price and profits as functions of 𝑡. Since these two
variables depend on 𝑡 even without divestiture, the effect of
divestiture is captured in the price ratios (the left panel of
Figure 1) and profit ratios (the right panel).
A firm’s capital stock represents its size, more specifically
its capacity, relative to the demand. Capital matters for
divestiture because it determines how responsive a firm is to
other firms’ output changes. When both firms are very small,
each operates with a very steep marginal cost curve. Since
there is little interaction between the two firms, there is no
need to divest: When 𝑡 → 0, 𝑛𝐿 = 𝑛𝐹 = 𝑛𝑀 = 1, so the
order of divestiture does not matter. As both firms’ capital
increases, the interaction between them becomes stronger,
and so does the incentive to divest. Equilibrium divestiture
increases regardless of the order of moves, as 𝑝𝑄/𝑝0 and
𝑝
𝑀
/𝑝
0 both decline with 𝑡. However, the overall divestiture is
always larger with simultaneous moves than with sequential
moves (𝑝𝑀 < 𝑝𝑄), and capital matters more in simultaneous
divestiture than in sequential divestiture. At the limit, when 𝑡
approaches infinity, 𝑝𝑀/𝑝0 = 0 but 𝑝𝑄/𝑝0 = 3/4, meaning
that simultaneous divestiture leads to perfect competition,
but sequential divestiture will lead to competition that is
greatly constrained (the market price is 3/4 of the level when
neither firm divests). In terms of profits, whenmc is constant
(𝑡 is infinity), simultaneous divestiture leads to zero profit for
both firms, but sequential divestiture gives substantial profits
to both firms, with the follower earning twice as much as the
leader: 𝜋𝐿
𝑖
/𝜋
0
𝑖
= 9/16, while 𝜋𝐹
𝑖
/𝜋
0
𝑖
= 9/8. Note that the
follower’s profit is larger than without divestiture (𝜋𝐹
𝑖
/𝜋
0
𝑖
> 1)
when 𝑡 is sufficiently large.
To summarize, for any given stock of capital, there is a dif-
ference between simultaneous moves and sequential moves,
and the difference increases with the amount of capital,
becoming most dramatic as capital approaches infinity, that
is, when marginal costs are constant.
4.5. Firm Asymmetry. All previous models have assumed
symmetric firms. Because the major innovation of this study
is to endogenize the order of moving, it has for simplicity
focused on an industry with only two firms. This simpli-
fication allows the firms to be asymmetric, which offers
an opportunity to study how divestitures change the firms’
relative strengths and market shares. Since the equilibrium
choice depicted in (6) does not admit any closed-form solu-
tion, numerical calculation is sometimes required. Doing so
involves little loss of rigor, as there are only two parameters (𝑡
𝐿
and 𝑡
𝐹
) and all the results can be inspected using 3D graphs.20
Proposition 4. In equilibrium (i.e., when firms divest sequen-
tially), (i) 𝑠𝐿
𝑖
< 𝑠
𝐹
𝑖
and (ii) 𝜋𝐿
𝑖
+ 𝜋
𝐹
𝑗
> 𝜋
𝐿
𝑗
+ 𝜋
𝐹
𝑖
if and only if
𝑡
𝑖
< 𝑡
𝑗
.
Proposition 4(i) says that a firm’s market share as the
follower is always greater than its share as the leader. This
is consistent with Lemma 1 which says that a firm’s profit as
the follower is greater than its profit as the leader, and for the
same reason.The leader has an extra incentive to constrain its
expansion in order to restrict the follower’s expansion, while
the follower does not face such a constraint.
Proposition 4(ii) says that the industry’s total profit is
greater when the larger firm is the follower. There are two
reasons for this result. First, the smaller firm tends to divest
more than the larger one,21 and the follower tends to divest
more than the leader (Lemma 1). If the larger firm is the
follower, the industrywide divestiture is more limited (see
Proposition 6). The industry’s output will be smaller, and the
industry’s total profit will be greater. Second, even with the
same industry output, production cost is lower when the
larger firm is the follower. Recall that a firm divests more
when it is the follower (Lemma 1), so when the larger firm
is the follower, the divided capital will be more balanced;
therefore, the industry’s total production cost will be lower.
As Proposition 2 shows, both sequences in sequential
divestitures constitute equilibria. To arrive at a unique equi-
librium, suppose that the two firms bid to be the follower
in some formal game—a kind of war of attrition. In that
case, the equilibrium sequence will be the one that yields
the greater industry profit. According to Proposition 4(ii),
then, the smaller firm will be the leader in such a unique
equilibrium, while the larger firm will be the follower. Since
the follower tends to divest more, this would make the size
distribution among the divisions more balanced.
4.6. Welfare. The equilibrium price for the industry’s homo-
geneous product has been shown to be 𝑝 = 𝑎/(1 + 𝐺).
When the industry’s aggregate dispersion 𝐺 increases, the
price drops, so the consumer surplus increases. Since 𝐺 ≡
𝑛
𝑖
𝑔
𝑖
+ 𝑛
𝑗
𝑔
𝑗
and firm 𝑖’s dispersion, 𝑛
𝑖
𝑔
𝑖
≡ 𝑛
𝑖
𝑡
𝑖
/(𝑛
𝑖
+ 𝑡
𝑖
),
increases with 𝑛
𝑖
, consumer surplus is improved if either
firm’s divestiture increases.
Social welfare differs from consumer surplus because pro-
duction efficiency nowmatters. Efficient production requires
all Cournot competitors’ marginal costs to equate in equilib-
rium. Section 3.1 has shown that each division from firm 𝑖 has
an equilibrium marginal cost proportional to 1/(1 + (𝑡
𝑖
/𝑛
𝑖
)),
where 𝑡
𝑖
/𝑛
𝑖
is an 𝑖-division’s capital level. The industry’s
overall production efficiency will then be improved if 𝑡
𝑖
/𝑛
𝑖
is
closer to 𝑡
𝑗
/𝑛
𝑗
, that is, if divestitures generate divisions that
are more balanced in size. Conversely, production efficiency
and hence social welfare may be damaged if divestitures
increase the size discrepancy between the two firms’ divi-
sions. This would be the case if the smaller firm’s divesti-
ture increased while the larger firm’s divestiture remained
constant.22 To see an example, note that social welfare is
𝑊 ≡ CS + 𝜋
𝑖
+ 𝜋
𝑗
=
𝐺
1 + 𝐺
+ (
𝐺
1 + 𝐺
)
2
ℎ,
(10)
where CS is consumer surplus and ℎ ≡ ∑
𝑑∈𝐷
𝑠
2
𝑑
= (𝑛
𝑖
𝑔
2
𝑖
+
𝑛
𝑗
𝑔
2
𝑗
)/𝐺
2 is the Hirfindahl index. Let 𝑡
𝑖
= 10 and 𝑡
𝑗
= 1.
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Figure 1: The comparison between sequential and simultaneous divestitures when the two firms are symmetric.
Holding 𝑛
𝑖
= 1, social welfare declines monotonically as 𝑛
𝑗
increases. Holding 𝑛
𝑗
= 1, welfare increases with 𝑛
𝑖
up to 𝑛
𝑖
=
50 and then declines. If 𝑛
𝑖
and 𝑛
𝑗
both increase while main-
taining the balance between divisions, for example, by keep-
ing 𝑡
𝑖
/𝑛
𝑖
= 𝑡
𝑗
/𝑛
𝑗
, then social welfare always increases. This
discussion of welfare would apply where the number of divi-
sions is chosen by a social planner or an antitrust authority.
Turning to equilibrium divestitures, we must first estab-
lish the following result.
Lemma 5. 𝑛𝐿 > 1 when 𝑡
𝐹
> 0, and 𝑛𝐿 = 1 when 𝑡
𝐹
= 0.
The lemma says that the leader in a sequential game will
always divest to some extent (𝑛𝐿 > 1) unless it faces no
competition (i.e., the follower has zero capital). Lemmas 1
and 5 then imply that 𝑛𝑀 > 𝑛𝐹 > 𝑛𝐿 > 1. As a result,
𝐺 (𝑛
𝑀
𝑖
, 𝑛
𝑀
𝑗
) > 𝐺 (𝑛
𝐿
𝑖
, 𝑛
𝐹
𝑗
) > 𝐺 (1, 1). That is, the consumer
surplus will be increased by sequential divestitures and will
be increased even more by simultaneous divestitures.
Between the two sequences of sequential divestitures, the
one in which the larger firm is the follower generates the
greater social welfare (and the greater total industry profit,
as established earlier), but a smaller consumer surplus than
the alternative sequence. The reason is that when the larger
firm is the follower, the size of the divisions is more balanced,
making production more efficient. This gain in production
efficiency outweighs the loss of consumer surplus.
The above results can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 6. (i) Unilaterally increasing the extent of a firm’s
divestiture always increases the resulting consumer surplus, but
it may damage social welfare. Increasing the extent of both
firms’ divestitures while maintaining the balance between their
divisions always improves social welfare.
(ii) CS𝑀 > CS𝑄 > CS0; 𝑊𝑀 > 𝑊0, 𝑊𝑄 > 𝑊0. It may
happen that𝑊𝑀 < 𝑊𝑄 if the smaller firm serves as the leader.
(iii) CS𝑄 (𝐿 = 𝑖, 𝐹 = 𝑗) > CS𝑄(𝐿 = 𝑗, 𝐹 = 𝑖) and
𝑊
𝑄
(𝐿 = 𝑖, 𝐹 = 𝑗) < 𝑊
𝑄
(𝐿 = 𝑗, 𝐹 = 𝑖) if and only if 𝑡
𝑖
> 𝑡
𝑗
.
5. Concluding Remarks
This study has two distinctive features: first, the endogenized
order of divestitures which solves the divestiture paradox.
Second, capital is introduced into the production function
so that marginal costs are increasing. The second feature,
although not essential for resolving the divestiture paradox,
is nonetheless desirable because it enables more reasonable
modeling of divestitures and admits the commonly assumed
constant marginal costs as a special case. A firm’s capital
stock is also a natural way to model its size and hence firm
asymmetry. Combining the two features generates some new
insights. For example, it reveals that the leader may divest
less when the follower becomes bigger, and that the follower
may benefit from divestitures.These conclusions are different
from those applicable to simultaneous divestitures, where a
firm always divests more when the rival is bigger and both
firms are hurt by divestitures.
The model assumes linear demand and two firms, but
linearity of demand is not driving the divestiture paradox.
Corchon and Gonzalez-Maestre [19] have shown that Cor-
chon’s [1] conclusion still holds under mild conditions even
if the demand is nonlinear. The insight of this paper should
then still apply. The number of firms does not matter either.
When there are three or four firms, the overall divestiture is
still much smaller with sequential rather than simultaneous
moves. The reason is the same as in the main model: because
divestitures are strategic complements and because a firm
suffers from other firms’ divestitures, an early mover will
reduce its own divestiture in order to constrain later movers’
divestitures.
Appendix
Derivation of Cournot equilibrium. For division 𝑘 ∈ 𝐷, its
profit is 𝜋
𝑘
= 𝑝𝑞
𝑘
−𝐶(𝑡
𝑘
, 𝑞
𝑘
) = (𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄
−𝑘
− 𝑏𝑞
𝑘
)𝑞
𝑘
− (𝑞
2
𝑘
/2𝑡
𝑘
),
in which 𝑄
−𝑘
= ∑
𝑑∈𝐷\𝑘
𝑞
𝑑
. The first-order condition (FOC)
is 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄
−𝑘
− 2𝑏𝑞
𝑘
− (1/𝑡
𝑘
)𝑞
𝑘
= 0 or equivalently 𝑏𝑞
𝑘
=
𝑔
𝑘
(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄). Summing up the FOC for all divisions in 𝐷
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yields 𝑄 = (𝑎/𝑏)(𝐺/(1 + 𝐺)). Plug 𝑄 into the FOC to obtain
𝑞
𝑘
= (𝑎/𝑏) (𝑔
𝑘
/(1+𝐺)).Then,𝜋
𝑘
= (𝑎
2
𝑔
𝑘
(1+𝑔
𝑘
))/(2𝑏(1+𝐺)
2
).
Proof of Lemma 1. 𝑛𝐿
𝑖
= argmax
𝑛𝑖
𝜋
𝑖
(𝑛
𝑖
, 𝑛
𝑗
)where 𝑛
𝑗
= 𝑛∗(𝑛
𝑖
).
At 𝑛
𝑖
= 𝑛
𝐿
𝑖
,𝑑𝜋
𝑖
/𝑑𝑛
𝑖
= (𝜕𝜋
𝑖
/𝜕𝑛
𝑖
)+(𝜕𝜋
𝑖
/𝜕𝑛
𝑗
) (𝑑𝑛
𝑗
/𝑑𝑛
𝑖
) = 0. But
𝜕𝜋
𝑖
/𝜕𝑛
𝑗
< 0 while 𝑑𝑛
𝑗
/𝑑𝑛
𝑖
= 𝑛
∗󸀠
(⋅) > 0, so 𝜕𝜋
𝑖
(𝑛
𝐿
𝑖
)/𝜕𝑛
𝑖
> 0.
Meanwhile, 𝑛𝑀
𝑖
= argmax
𝑛𝑖
𝜋
𝑖
(𝑛
𝑖
, 𝑛
𝑗
) so 𝜕𝜋
𝑖
(𝑛
𝑀
𝑖
)/𝜕𝑛
𝑖
= 0.
Since 𝜕𝜋
𝑖
(𝑛
𝐿
𝑖
)/𝜕𝑛
𝑖
> 𝜕𝜋
𝑖
(𝑛
𝑀
𝑖
)/𝜕𝑛
𝑖
and 𝜕2𝜋
𝑖
/𝜕𝑛
2
𝑖
< 0, we
conclude that 𝑛𝐿
𝑖
< 𝑛
𝑀
𝑖
.
By symmetry, 𝑛𝐿
𝑗
< 𝑛
𝑀
𝑗
. But 𝑛𝐹
𝑖
= 𝑛
∗
(𝑛
𝐿
𝑗
) and 𝑛𝑀
𝑖
=
𝑛
∗
(𝑛
𝑀
𝑗
). Because 𝑛∗󸀠(⋅) > 0, we have 𝑛𝐹
𝑖
< 𝑛
𝑀
𝑖
. Now we must
show that 𝑛𝐿
𝑖
< 𝑛
𝐹
𝑖
. Suppose it is not (i.e., 𝑛𝐿
𝑖
≥ 𝑛
𝐹
𝑖
). Then by
symmetry, 𝑛𝐿
𝑗
≥ 𝑛
𝐹
𝑗
,
𝑛
𝐹
𝑖
= 𝑛
∗
(𝑛
𝐿
𝑗
)
≥ 𝑛
∗
(𝑛
𝐹
𝑗
) (because 𝑛𝐿
𝑗
≥ 𝑛
𝐹
𝑗
and 𝑛∗󸀠 (⋅) > 0)
= argmax
𝑛𝑖
𝜋
𝑖
(𝑛
𝑖
, 𝑛
𝐹
𝑗
)
> argmax
𝑛𝑖
𝜋
𝑖
(𝑛
𝑖
, 𝑛
∗
(𝑛
𝑖
))
(because
𝜕𝜋
𝑖
𝜕𝑛
𝑗
< 0, 𝑛
∗󸀠
(⋅) > 0 and 𝑛𝐹
𝑗
= 𝑛
∗
(𝑛
𝐿
𝑖
))
= 𝑛
𝐿
𝑖
,
(A.1)
which is a clear contradiction.
For profits,
𝜋
𝐹
𝑖
= max
𝑛𝑖
𝜋
𝑖
(𝑛
𝑖
, 𝑛
𝐿
𝑗
)
> max
𝑛𝑖
𝜋
𝑖
(𝑛
𝑖
, 𝑛
𝐹
𝑗
)
(by the envelope theorem,
𝜕𝜋
𝑖
𝜕𝑛
𝑗
<0, and 𝑛𝐿
𝑗
<𝑛
𝐹
𝑗
)
> 𝜋
𝑖
(𝑛
𝐿
𝑖
, 𝑛
𝐹
𝑗
)
= 𝜋
𝐿
𝑖
= max
𝑛𝑖
𝜋
𝑖
(𝑛
𝑖
, 𝑛
∗
(𝑛
𝑖
))
> 𝜋
𝑖
(𝑛
𝑀
𝑖
, 𝑛
∗
(𝑛
𝑀
𝑖
)) (because 𝑛𝐿
𝑖
̸= 𝑛
𝑀
𝑖
)
= 𝜋
𝑀
𝑖
.
(A.2)
Proof of Lemma 3. 𝑛𝐿 is solved from 𝛽(𝑛𝐿) = 0 or equiva-
lently 𝛽(𝑛𝐿)/𝑡2
𝐿
𝑡
2
𝐹
= 0. When 𝑡
𝑖
→ ∞ and 𝑡
𝑗
→ ∞,
𝛽(𝑛
𝐿
)/𝑡
2
𝐿
𝑡
2
𝐹
= −2𝑛
𝐿
+ 2, so 𝑛𝐿 = 1. Then, 𝑛𝐹 = 𝑛∗(𝑛𝐿) =
1 + (𝑛
𝐿
𝑡
𝐿
/(𝑛
𝐿
+ 𝑡
𝐿
)) = 2.
Proof of Proposition 4(i). Suppose that 𝑠𝐿
𝑖
> 𝑠
𝐹
𝑖
.Then by sym-
metry, 𝑠𝐿
𝑗
> 𝑠
𝐹
𝑗
. Because 𝑠𝐿
𝑖
= 𝑛
𝐿
𝑖
𝑔
𝐿
𝑖
/(𝑛
𝐿
𝑖
𝑔
𝐿
𝑖
+ 𝑛
𝐹
𝑗
𝑔
𝐹
𝑗
), we have
𝜋
𝐿
𝑖
=
𝑛
𝐿
𝑖
𝑔
𝐿
𝑖
(1 + 𝑔
𝐿
𝑖
)
(1 + 𝑛
𝐿
𝑖
𝑔
𝐿
𝑖
+ 𝑛
𝐹
𝑗
𝑔
𝐹
𝑗
)
2
= 𝑠
𝐿
𝑖
(1 + 𝑔
𝐿
𝑖
)
𝑛
𝐿
𝑖
𝑔
𝐿
𝑖
+ 𝑛
𝐹
𝑗
𝑔
𝐹
𝑗
(1 + 𝑛
𝐿
𝑖
𝑔
𝐿
𝑖
+ 𝑛
𝐹
𝑗
𝑔
𝐹
𝑗
)
2
.
(A.3)
Similarly,
𝜋
𝐹
𝑗
= 𝑠
𝐹
𝑗
(1 + 𝑔
𝐹
𝑗
)
𝑛
𝐿
𝑖
𝑔
𝐿
𝑖
+ 𝑛
𝐹
𝑗
𝑔
𝐹
𝑗
(1 + 𝑛
𝐿
𝑖
𝑔
𝐿
𝑖
+ 𝑛
𝐹
𝑗
𝑔
𝐹
𝑗
)
2
. (A.4)
Then,𝜋𝐿
𝑖
/𝜋
𝐹
𝑗
= 𝑠
𝐿
𝑖
(1+𝑔
𝐿
𝑖
)/𝑠
𝐹
𝑗
(1+𝑔
𝐹
𝑗
). Similarly,𝜋𝐹
𝑖
/𝜋
𝐿
𝑗
= 𝑠
𝐹
𝑖
(1+
𝑔
𝐹
𝑖
)/𝑠
𝐿
𝑗
(1 + 𝑔
𝐿
𝑗
). Now, because 𝑠𝐿
𝑖
> 𝑠
𝐹
𝑖
and 𝑠𝐿
𝑗
> 𝑠
𝐹
𝑗
, we have
𝑠
𝐿
𝑖
/𝑠
𝐹
𝑗
> 𝑠
𝐹
𝑖
/𝑠
𝐿
𝑗
. Because 𝑛𝐿
𝑖
< 𝑛
𝐹
𝑖
and 𝑛𝐿
𝑗
< 𝑛
𝐹
𝑗
(Lemma 1), we
have (1+𝑔𝐿
𝑖
)/(1+𝑔
𝐹
𝑗
) = (1+(𝑡
𝑖
/(𝑛
𝐿
𝑖
+𝑡
𝑖
)))/(1+(𝑡
𝑗
/(𝑛
𝐹
𝑗
+𝑡
𝑗
))) >
(1 + (𝑡
𝑖
/(𝑛
𝐹
𝑖
+ 𝑡
𝑖
)))/(1 + (𝑡
𝑗
/(𝑛
𝐿
𝑗
+ 𝑡
𝑗
))) = (1 + 𝑔
𝐹
𝑖
)/(1 + 𝑔
𝐿
𝑗
).
As a result, we conclude that 𝜋𝐿
𝑖
/𝜋
𝐹
𝑗
> 𝜋
𝐹
𝑖
/𝜋
𝐿
𝑗
or equivalently
𝜋
𝐿
𝑖
/𝜋
𝐹
𝑖
> 𝜋
𝐹
𝑗
/𝜋
𝐿
𝑗
. By Lemma 1, 𝜋𝐿
𝑖
< 𝜋
𝐹
𝑖
. Therefore, 𝜋𝐹
𝑗
/𝜋
𝐿
𝑗
<
𝜋
𝐿
𝑖
/𝜋
𝐹
𝑖
< 1 or 𝜋𝐹
𝑗
< 𝜋
𝐿
𝑗
. But this contradicts Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 5. 𝑛𝐿 is implicitly defined by 𝛽(𝑛𝐿) = 0.
Because 𝛽(1) = 𝑡
𝐹
(1 + 2𝑡
𝐿
)
2
≥ 0 and 𝛽(∞) < 0, 𝛽(𝑛𝐿) = 0 has
at least one root on [1,∞). Furthermore, the root is greater
than 1 if and only if 𝑡
𝐹
> 0. Now it must be shown that this
root is unique on (0,∞).
Suppose the contrary. Then, because 𝛽(𝑛𝐿) is cubic in 𝑛𝐿
with 𝛽(0) > 0 and 𝛽(∞) < 0, 𝛽(𝑛𝐿) = 0 must have three
roots on (0,∞). Further, it must be true that 𝛽󸀠(0) < 0 and
𝛽
󸀠
(𝑛
𝐿
) > 0 at one of the roots.
Now, 𝛽󸀠(0) = 𝑡
𝐿
(6𝑡
𝐹
+ 𝑡
𝐿
+ 2 + 2𝑡
𝐿
𝑡
𝐹
+ 4𝑡
2
𝐹
− 2𝑡
𝐿
𝑡
2
𝐹
) and
[𝛽
󸀠
(𝑛
𝐿
)]𝑛
𝐿
− 𝛽(𝑛
𝐿
) = 2𝛽
3
(𝑛
𝐿
)
3
+ 𝛽
2
(𝑛
𝐿
)
2
− 𝛽
0
, where 𝛽
3
=
−[(1 + 𝑡
𝐿
+ 𝑡
𝐹
)
2
+ 𝑡
2
𝐹
] < 0, 𝛽
2
= [(1 + 𝑡
𝐹
)(1 + 2𝑡
𝐹
− 𝑡
2
𝐿
) − 4𝑡
𝐿
𝑡
2
𝐹
],
and 𝛽
0
= 𝑡
2
𝐿
(1 + 𝑡
𝐹
)(1 + 2𝑡
𝐹
) > 0. It is straightforward to
verify that 𝛽󸀠(0)/𝑡
𝐿
> 𝛽
2
. Then, if 𝛽
2
> 0, it must be true that
𝛽
󸀠
(0) > 0. If𝛽
2
< 0, then [𝛽󸀠(𝑛𝐿)]𝑛𝐿−𝛽(𝑛𝐿) < 0, meaning that
at any root (so 𝛽(𝑛𝐿) = 0), 𝛽󸀠(𝑛𝐿) < 0. This is a contradiction
because either case will violate the requirement that 𝛽󸀠(0) < 0
and 𝛽󸀠(𝑛𝐿) > 0 at one of the roots.
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Endnotes
1. This paper emphasizes the competition effects of divesti-
ture—the intensified competition between divested
units gives them a competitive advantage over rival
firms. Real-life examples such as the Ford-Volvo divesti-
ture inevitably involve multiple reasons including cost
effects (diseconomies of scope) and product differentia-
tion. But all divestitures, regardless of and on top of firm-
specific and market-specific details and complications,
invariably involve the competition effect, which is the
focus of this study.
2. Divestiture is generally defined as the sale of a subsidiary,
a division or a minority share to a new owner. In this
paper, divestiture means breaking a firm up into autono-
mous units that compete independently in the product
market. A common explanation for divestiture is dis-
economies of scope associated with managing multiple
product lines. In large organizations it becomes more
and more difficult to manage complex tasks, transmit
information, and motivate employees. When the costs
of producing multiple products outweigh its benefits,
divestiture becomes optimal. Bresnahan et al. [20] have
recently suggested that diseconomies of scope may arise
from the need for multiple products to share some com-
mon assets such as a credit rating, brand recognition,
or the reputation of the management team. Since the
diseconomies of scope motivation are straightforward
and well understood, this paper abstracts away from this
force by assuming away any cost advantage associated
with divestiture. Instead, the driving force is assumed to
arise through competition effects.
3. Lewis [21] and Schwartz andThompson [22] have shown
how setting up competing divisionsmay deter entry. Tan
and Yuan [23] provided an alternative theory of divesti-
tures: competing conglomeratesmay divest complemen-
tary product lines in order to mitigate product market
competition.
4. Put another way, firms will divest more when their
products are closer substitutes. Since firms hurt one
another through their divestitures, a stronger incentive
to divest would induce firms to seek ways to constrain
their divestitures. Qiu and Zhou [11] showed that if
mergers and divestitures are both possible in an industry,
firms will avoid divestitures by merging with each other
when their products are close substitutes. In that case,
a moderate degree of product differentiation will be
conducive to divestitures, while very strong or very weak
differentiation will be conducive to mergers.
5. Product differentiation may thus explain divestitures
observed in real life, such as the one cleaving Ford and
Volvo. The two papers also explored other issues related
to divestitures when products are differentiated. Ziss [3]
showed that product differentiation will lead to a num-
ber of comparative statics results that are different from
the ones obtained in previous studies assuming homoge-
neous products, while Yuan [4] demonstrated that entry
will induce vigorous competition when incumbent firms
have the option of setting up autonomous divisions, so
divestiture can serve as a natural barrier to entry.
6. The same logic is also behind product proliferation
[25]. Britain’s Tesco stocks 91 different shampoos, 93
varieties of toothpaste, and 115 of household cleaner,
many of which are produced by the same company. For
example, Tropicana offers more than 20 different freshly
pulped juices (“The tyranny of choice,” The Economist,
12/16/2010).
7. Away out of themerger paradox is to alter or weaken the
responsiveness: firms may compete on price rather than
quantity [26]; marginal costs may be increasing [16]; or
products may be differentiated [24]. Alternatively, the
merger paradox disappears if mergers generate substan-
tial benefits such as information pooling [24] or more
efficient production in the face of cost uncertainty [27].
8. It is natural to assume that all firms can divest, so the
endogenization is about the order of moves. A merger,
by contrast, is inherently exogenous if the identity
of the merging firms is exogenously determined, so
endogenization can be in terms of many dimensions.
If a firm can choose whether to join a single merger or
stay out, the merger incentive will be further weakened
[28], so the merger paradox cannot be solved by endo-
genization. If multiple mergers are allowed, the merger
incentive can be strengthened [29]. Qiu and Zhou have
shown that mergers are strategic complements, and that
sequential mergers expand the scope of equilibrium
mergers. This study has found that divestitures are also
strategic complements, and sequential divestitures limit
the scope of equilibrium divestitures.
9. This can be seen in real life [12, p.863]: “After Volvo and
Ford merged, Ford’s luxury brand, Jaguar, continued
to compete with Volvo. A similar pattern was observed
when Daimler and Chrysler merged. When Kimberly
Clark and Scott Paper merged, Kleenex, the leading
brand of Kimberly Clark in the facial tissue market,
remained in competition with Scottie, the leading brand
of Scott Paper.” Note that even though Ford and Volvo
maintained some competition after their merger, the
competition was most credible and pushed to the largest
extent only after Volvo had been spun off and operated
as a truly independent entity.
10. Both firms possess the same constant-return-to-scale
technology 𝑞 = (𝑡𝑙)1/2, in which 𝑡 is capital and 𝑙 is labor.
In the short run, when its capital is fixed at 𝑡
𝑖
, firm 𝑖’s
variable cost is 𝐶
𝑖
≡ min
𝑙𝑖
𝑤𝑙
𝑖
subject to 𝑞
𝑖
= (𝑡
𝑖
𝑙
𝑖
)
1/2, in
which 𝑤 is the wage rate. The optimization leads to a
cost of (𝑤/𝑡
𝑖
) 𝑞
2
𝑖
, and the formulation assumed in the
model results when the wage rate 𝑤 = 1/2.
11. Commitment may seem to be an issue here. Suppose
that 𝑦 divests after 𝑥 does. What does then prevent 𝑥’s
divisions from further divestiture after 𝑦’s divestiture? In
fact this is a challenge faced by all studies of divestitures
regardless of the order of moves. One way out is to
assume costly divestitures, in particular, a fixed cost for
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divestiture that is independent of the divesting firm’s
capital. A divisionwill then be less likely to divest than its
parent because the division is smaller and therefore may
not generate enough profit to cover the fixed divestiture
cost. Note that this explanation requires divisions to
be smaller than their parents, which is true only in the
formulation assumed in this model. Veendorp [30] has
shown in an entry-deterrence model that it is indeed
optimal for the parent firm to allow divisions freedom in
their operations but not in investment, which presum-
ably would include setting up their own subdivisions.
12. Itmust be emphasized that equal division is optimal only
when the number of divisions is optimally chosen. Itmay
happen that an unequal distribution between two divi-
sions generates greater total profits than an equal distri-
bution, but the firm’s optimal choice is then not to divest;
that is, it will not have two divisions in equilibrium.
13. The demand intercept, 𝑎, enters the equilibrium profits
only through the common coefficient 𝑎2 and therefore
does not affect a firm’s divestiture choice as long as
divestiture is costless. As for the demand slope, 𝑏, in
addition to being a coefficient of the profit function,
it also appears in the expression for 𝑔
𝑘
and therefore
will affect the divestiture incentives. However, since
𝑏 is always associated with 𝑡
𝑘
in the same manner, its
normalization is only a rescaling of the capital stock,
which will be the focus of the discussion.
14. Not divesting is a choice if 𝑛
𝑖
= 1. Later it will be shown
that 𝑛
𝑖
≥ 1 in the equilibrium.
15. In this model divestitures are costless, so a firm’s optimal
divestiture depends only on the two firms’ relative
market shares. This leads to strategic complementarity.
If divestitures were costly the strategic interdependence
would be more complicated. Because a firm’s profits are
reduced by its rival’s divestiture, if the rival divests more,
the firm’s divisions may not generate enough profit to
cover the divestiture cost. In that case, the firm may
respond by choosing to divest less; that is, divestitures
may become strategic substitutes. That is why Baye
et al. [2] found that a firm’s optimal divestiture is
inversely 𝑈-shaped in relation to its rivals’ divestitures:
divestitures are strategic complements when the rival
divests little, but become strategic substitutes when the
rival divests more extensively. Note that the nature of the
strategic interdependence depends crucially on whether
divestitures are costly. In all models where divestitures
are assumed to be costless [1, 3–5], divestitures are
strategic complements.
16. Although each individual division is smaller than the
parent, all the divisions together “equal” the parent.
Because the parent divides its capital equally among
all its divisions, a divestiture does not impose any cost
advantage or disadvantage. For any given total output,
the divisions’ joint production cost is exactly the same
as the parent’s was previously. Such a formulation facili-
tates focusing on the competition effects of divestitures
without the complication of any cost effect due to, say,
diseconomies of scope.
17. Both Ziss [3] and Yuan [4] assumed that products within
a group are perfect substitutes. Onewonderswhether the
within-firm substitutability can take other values or even
be endogenized, and whether their conclusions still hold
under alternative formulations about substitutability.
As is shown in the appendix, firm 𝑘’s profit is 𝜋
𝑘
= (𝑎 −
𝑏𝑄
−𝑘
−𝑏𝑞
𝑘
) 𝑞
𝑘
−(𝑞
2
𝑘
/2𝑡
𝑘
), which can be rewritten as 𝜋
𝑘
=
[𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄
−𝑘
− (𝑏 + (1/2𝑡
𝑘
)) 𝑞
𝑘
] 𝑞
𝑘
. The latter expression
can be viewed as the profit function of a firm with zero
mc and differentiated products, as the own-elasticity
captured by 𝑏+(1/2𝑡
𝑘
) is greater than the cross-elasticity
captured by 𝑏. Firm asymmetry is then reflected in dif-
ferent own-elasticities for the two firms: 𝑏+(1/2𝑡
𝑖
) ̸= 𝑏+
(1/2𝑡
𝑗
). Unlike the product differentiation formulation,
the increasing mc approach does not require any
additional ad hoc assumptions about the substitutability
of newly created productswhenfirmsdivest. By breaking
up the parent’s capital, a divestiture means that all
divisions from the same firm produce symmetrically
differentiated products. Divisions from firm 𝑖 all have
the same own-elasticity captured by 𝑏 + 1/ (2𝑡
𝑖
/𝑛
𝑖
),
which is greater than the cross-elasticity captured by
𝑏. Substitutability across firms remains asymmetric:
𝑏 + 1/ (2𝑡
𝑖
/𝑛
𝑖
) ̸= 𝑏 + 1/ (2𝑡
𝑗
/𝑛
𝑗
). Finally, demand for
a division’s product becomes more elastic than the
demand for the parent’s: 𝑏 + 1/ (2𝑡
𝑖
/𝑛
𝑖
) > 𝑏 + (1/2𝑡
𝑖
).
18. Firm 𝑘’s profit is 𝜋
𝑘
= (𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄
−𝑘
− 𝑏𝑞
𝑘
) 𝑞
𝑘
− (𝑞
2
𝑘
/2𝑡
𝑘
)
when products are homogeneous. If products are differ-
entiated, the profit becomes 𝜋
𝑘
= (𝑎 − 𝑑𝑄
−𝑘
− 𝑏𝑞
𝑘
)𝑞
𝑘
−
(𝑞
2
𝑘
/2𝑡
𝑘
) with 𝑏 ≥ 𝑑 > 0, and 𝑧 = 𝑑/𝑏 represents the
degree of product substitutability (using the notations
of Yuan [4]). This profit expression can be rewritten
as 𝜋
𝑘
= [𝑎 − 𝑑𝑄
−𝑘
− (𝑏 + (1/2𝑡
𝑘
)) 𝑞
𝑘
] 𝑞
𝑘
, which is as
if marginal costs were zero (and therefore constant),
while the degree of product substitutability drops to
𝑑/ (𝑏 + (1/2𝑡
𝑘
)). Product differentiation and increasing
mc can therefore be regarded as two special cases of
the more general formulation: 𝑡
𝑘
= ∞ if products are
differentiated but 𝑚𝑐 = 0, while 𝑑 = 𝑏 if products are
homogeneous but mc is increasing. Given increasing
mc, introducing product differentiation will change
only the degree of substitutability, but the qualitative
results of the model remain valid. In real life, products
are mostly differentiated (e.g., as are Volvo versus Ford
brands), and one can reasonably argue that marginal
costs are increasing in the relevant range. Therefore,
both elements may play a role in constraining the extent
of divestiture in real life. In terms of modeling, since
the role of product differentiation is well understood
through the work of Ziss [3] and Yuan [4], this paper
focused on two new features: endogenized order of
divestitures and increasing marginal costs.
19. The result will not change when 𝑡
𝑖
and 𝑡
𝑗
differ and they
change independently.
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20. These graphs were generated using Maple 16 software.
Proposition 4(i) is proved analytically in the appendix,
and the validity of (ii) can be demonstrated by numerical
calculation.
21. The two firms differ in both their capital stocks and their
roles in sequential divestiture. To isolate the effects of the
two asymmetries, it will be useful to look at simultaneous
divestiture even though it is off the equilibrium path. It
can be shown that when the two firms divest simulta-
neously, (i) the larger firm divests into fewer divisions,
which would enlarge the size discrepancy between the
two firms’ divisions; (ii) the smaller firm’s market share
is reduced and, as a result, firm asymmetry is amplified;
and (iii) the smaller firm is hurtmore than the larger one.
22. The flip side of this result is that a merger between two
small firms may improve social welfare [18].
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